Abstract

The "skeptical crisis" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is widely believed to have been brought on by the Protestant Reformation and fueled primarily by the "rediscovery" of ancient skeptical teachings, particularly those found in the second-century writings attributed to Sextus Empiricus. In truth, however, the basic arguments of the ancient skeptics were known throughout the Middle Ages, and the flowering of skepticism in the early modern period was essentially the reaffirmation of a long-standing Christian commitment to the primacy of faith over reason that evolved in response to continuous and dramatic cultural upheaval rather than as a reaction to discreet, seminal events. Classical sources, some of which ultimately must be seen as more significant in this respect than the writings of Sextus Ernpiricus, played an important role, but so did Judeo-Christian materials that have received little attention in this context. An important figure in the story of early modern skepticism is the French essayist Michel de Montaigne, who is generally regarded as the most influential of the sixteenth-century skeptics. Montaigne's skepticism has often been portrayed as a mere phase in his thought, the temporary result of a personal skeptical crisis supposedly provoked by a reading of Sextus Empiricus, and relatively little attention has been devoted to other possible influences on Montaigne's skepticism. Recent Montaigne scholarship, however, has begun to address this problem and has demonstrated that skepticism is fundamental to Montaigne's outlook and to the Essais as a whole, and pre-dates his alleged encounter with Sextus Empiricus. Nonetheless, most scholars still regard Sextus Empiricus as one of the most important of Montaigne's sources, and considerable disagreement remains as to the impact of theological considerations and contemporary events on Montaigne's thought. In this study I argue that Montaigne's skepticism has more affinity with the doubt of Socrates and Augustine than with the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus and that his reflection on the human condition led him to a probabilistic, rather than a truly skeptical or relativistic, conception of knowledge in matters both earthly and divine