‘World’ and ‘Paradigm’ in Heidegger and Kuhn

Franciscanum 63 (175):1-16 (2021)
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Abstract

My goal in this paper is to compare Heidegger’s philosophy of science with Thomas Kuhn’s. With this comparison I want to pursue two goals: 1) using Kuhn’s arsenal of conceptual tools, to make Heidegger’s position appear in a clearer fashion; and 2) to show that Heidegger’s and Kuhn’s positions are not so different as one might expect. I will, thus, suggest that these philosophies can be compatible. I will show that, even if there are differences, there are many similarities as well. I will address three issues: 1) the differences and similarities between Kuhn’s notion of paradigm and Heidegger’s notion of world; 2) the analogous concepts of “normal science” and “calculating thinking”; and 3) the source of intelligibility in both authors. Here, I believe, is where the main difference between both thinkers lays.

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