Immoral Psychology: The Cognitivist's Conundrum
Dissertation, City University of New York (
2003)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
That people do wrong would appear to be a moral datum: a moral realm without wrongdoing may not be coherent. Thus, an adequate philosophic theory of morality ought to allow for it. But such a theory ought also to explain wrongdoing, both axiologically and causally. This is so if we take such a theory to have practical significance. Indeed, insofar as moral philosophy and its cognate areas have practical significance, explaining wrongdoing is arguably the most pressing practical issue for theory construction in this domain. For a philosophical theory of morality to have practical significance, and, further, to have influence on behavior, it must be psychologically relevant to the organisms that it ranges over. That is, the concepts that the theory purports to explain must be plausibly realized within the psychology of the creatures for which the theory is intended. Any theory satisfying this constraint would then be in a position to illuminate those psychological features that are explanatory of blameworthy behavior. The argument presented here is that moral realism and its underlying moral psychology, cognitivism, face serious difficulties allowing for and explaining, both metaphysically and psychologically, such behavior. Moral cognitivism and realism fail to adequately account for this most fundamental of moral phenomena. Hence, a comprehensive understanding of moral experience is impossible within the cognitivist/realist perspective