Judicial review: a practising judge's perspective

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19 (2):153-166 (1999)
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Abstract

In this lecture Justice Breyer examines three classical criticisms of constitutional judicial review. Those criticisms say that a grant to unelected judges of the power to set aside legislation as contrary to a written constitution leads to judicial decision-making that is (a) undemocratic, (b) subjective, and impractical. Justice Breyer describes features of the constitutional decision-making that do not dictate results in individual cases, but none the less hold the judges' 'subjective' will in check. He also describes necessary judicial efforts to focus upon considerations of administrative practicality. The description seeks, not to refute the criticisms in their entirety, but to help evaluate the extent to which those criticisms militate against the adoption of a system of constitutional judicial review

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