Philosophical Studies 112 (3):225 - 249 (2003)

Authors
Bredo Johnsen
University of Houston
Abstract
Hilary Putnam has offered two arguments to show that we cannotbe brains in a vat, and one to show that our cognitive situationcannot be fully analogous to that of brains in a vat. The latterand one of the former are irreparably flawed by misapplicationsof, or mistaken inferences from, his semantic externalism; thethird yields only a simple logical truth. The metaphysical realismthat is Putnams ultimate target is perfectly consistent withsemantic externalism.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1023/A:1023075527458
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Semantic Self-Knowledge and the Vat Argument.Joshua Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.

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