Authors
Bryson Brown
University of Lethbridge
Abstract
Just what forms do (or should) our cognitive attitudes towards scientific theories take? The nature of cognitive commitment becomes particularly puzzling when scientists' commitments are) inconsistent. And inconsistencies have often infected our best efforts in science and mathematics. Since there are no models of inconsistent sets of sentences, straightforward semantic accounts fail. And syntactic accounts based on classical logic also collapse, since the closure of any inconsistent set under classical logic includes every sentence. In this essay I present some evidence that there really was a substantial cognitive commitment to OQT, and that some of its characteristics have a simple and straightforward explanation in terms of a model based on a form of paraconsistent logic.
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One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and Complementarity.Margaret Morrison - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):342-351.
One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and Complementarity.Margaret Morrison - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):342-351.
Chunk and Permeate II: Bohr’s Hydrogen Atom.M. Bryson Brown & Graham Priest - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):297-314.
Can Partial Structures Accommodate Inconsistent Science?Peter Vickers - 2009 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (2):133-250.

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