Arrow's Theorem, Weglorz' Models and the Axiom of Choice

Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (3):335-359 (2000)
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Abstract

Applying Weglorz' mode s of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social we fare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying “finite discrimination”, if and only if in Weglorz' mode there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals

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Infinite Populations, Choice and Determinacy.Tadeusz Litak - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (5):969-999.

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