Back to the perceptual experience - on Merleau - Ponty, the body phenomenology, the primacy of perception

[author unknown]
Bulletin of Tokai Philosophy 15:157-170 (2010)
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Abstract

As part of our perception and understanding of the world's first contact with the basic experience, it goes beyond the subject-object dichotomy, sense of initiative and the integration of passive body, lay directly with the background of all conscious activity. Merleau - Ponty's phenomenology of the body of traditional knowledge on the subject is the return from the original perception of the phenomenon. This paper attempts a comprehensive analysis from the phenomenological point of view the meaning of perception, so that classical philosophy, whether it is empiricism or rationalism, regarded as a perceptual phenomenon is meaningless sense, and revert to a given objective world. Epistemological stance adopted to make the world we have lost consciousness, but also forgotten the foundation of science and values, then this demonstrates the philosophy of consciousness beyond the mind to return the objective necessity of perceptual experience.

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