Hume's Philosophy of History
Dissertation, University of Guelph (Canada) (
1981)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
The primary purpose of this thesis is to give a critical account of Hume's philosophy of history. ;The argument of this thesis is that Hume does not evolve two sharply distinctive methodologies as Livingston and others have alleged. Rather Hume's "moral" methodology is based on his analysis of causality, but includes introspectively available material. It is also argued that Hume's "science of man" progresses from the abstract to the concrete, and that this progression is programatic. Therefore, one of the functions of Hume's epistemological writings is to establish that moral science in general and a science of history in particular is possible. Hume does this by showing that moral phenomena can be analysed causally, and that history can be known through testimony and through an evaluation of human nature . ;In his theory of historical explanation, Hume holds that the main force underlying history is the interaction of the passions with circumstances. Like Condorcet, Hume has a conjectural history of the development of man, but, unlike Condorcet, Hume ascribes a large role to chance in history. Therefore, he offers few predictions and, politically, finds a conservative "message" in history. ;It is also shown that Hume's science of man and his philosophy of history are generated, in part, by his lifelong opposition to superstition, enthusiasm and barbarism, and that Hume's philosophical and historical work represents, in part, a defense of civilization. ;The principal criticism brought against Hume is that he wrongly attempts to reduce motives to causes. It is argued that motives, or reasons, display certain features which Humean efficient causes do not. They are or can be indeterminate; overdetermined; morally and non-morally evaluated; and have a telos, or end, which renders them intelligible in a way that causes are not. ;However, although it is shown that Hume's attempt to create a causal science of history is untenable, it is argued that his attempt to create a model of man has merit. Hume does not believe that men are always and everywhere the same, as some of his critics have maintained. Rather, Hume creates a fairly sophisticated model of man which allows for change at more concrete levels, while greater stability is maintained at more abstract levels. Human nature, according to Hume is changed primarily by historical forces, and it is shown that Hume's position, far from being based on the assumption that men remain unchanged, assumes that very real change occurs in man's nature