Abstract

Charles Sanders Peirce is a philosopher of considerable originality. This originality extends to his "interpretation" of Kant's philosophy with which he aligns himself. ;Although the principle of continuity--synechism--is the leading principle of Peirce's philosophy, its characterization is the subject of confusion to the reader of Peirce and to Peirce himself. Synechism from 1890-1902 has the character of an absolute and exact metaphysical doctrine which describes reality, and after 1902 it has the character of a regulative principle of logic which can warrant but a mere intellectual hope. ;In characterizing synechism as a regulative principle of logic, Peirce refers to Kant's regulative principles of homogeneity, specificity, and affinity by way of clarification, but he explains no further what he means. It is the object of this dissertation to take seriously Peirce's reference to Kant with regard to the principle of synechism and to set forth the consequences of doing so. ;Kant's regulative principles are shown to be second-order methodological principles, indispensable to the structure of science within the framework of empirical realism. Peirce explodes away the concept of Ding-an-sich and develops his own theory of realism. Synechism can be shown to be a second-order methodological principle critical to science and Peirce's theory of reality. ;It follows from the above account that Peirce cannot consistently hold synechism to be a metaphysical doctrine, exact and absolute. It is primarily a logical doctrine warranting an intellectual hope about the nature of reality. It follows, too, that whereas Peirce would have synechism be indispensable to scientific inquiry his framework of reality, unlike that of Kant, makes this difficult indeed