Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and explain the complex relationship between epistemology and ethics found in Plato's early and middle dialogues. This is accomplished by examining the cognitive aspect of virtue in a selection of dialogues, with special emphasis upon passages from the Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Protagoras, Euthydemus, Meno, Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic. An analysis of Plato's repeated use of the craft analogy first reveals the essential cognitive component of Platonic virtue. Building upon the epistemological distinction Plato draws between knowledge and opinion, further distinctions between additional cognitive states are then recognized and examined. The Platonic doctrine of the identity of virtue and knowledge is ultimately understood as the claim that each distinct cognitive state can be identified with a distinct level of virtue. The different degrees of virtue can be recognized by understanding the differences in the reliability and permanence of the associated cognitive state. The recognition of additional levels of cognition and their relationship to various degrees of virtue is not generally noted in the secondary literature. This dissertation helps to clarify that aspect of Platonic philosophy. ;Ultimately knowledge of the Good is seen as an ideal that is practically unachievable. Yet the recognition of different degrees of virtue, coupled with knowledge of the Good as a goal, provides a consistent account of Plato's ethical and epistemological views, while at the same time demonstrating how one can practically achieve a life of virtue. Such a life, in which one's actions are guided by the appropriate cognitive state, would allow one to avoid the error of acting without knowledge as a guide, and would ultimately enable one to live well and be happy