Abstract

The problems addressed in this dissertation are the problem of the justification of rights, and of their distribution as justified. I argue that classical attempts to justify rights, such as social contract theory and utilitarianism, fail. Then, using a Collingwoodian theoretical orientation, I develop the following claims concerning the justification of rights. First, it is a basic presupposition of our twentieth century Western society that rationally autonomous action and regard for basic interests are deserving of fundamental protection. This basic presupposition makes up the common core of all rights as we currently conceive of them. Hence, it is the function of specific individual rights to provide these protections. The manner in which rational autonomy and basic interests are to be protected is specified by the individual rights which stand relative to this more basic presupposition. Second, in order to have an adequate understanding of ourselves, our social interactions, and our political institutions, as well as an adequate basis for the comparison of our society with others, we must strive for a historical understanding of ourselves and the society to which we belong. This entails learning what presuppositions we share with other societies and at other points in time, and discovering the seeds/strains largely responsible for the development of our current society within an earlier historical phase. Finally, understanding ourselves as historical beings will enable us to make the kind of value judgments we will need in order to determine what direction to take in the creation of ourselves and of our society in the future