Moral expertise: Judgment, practice, and analysis*: Julia driver

Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):280-296 (2013)
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This essay defends moral expertise against the skeptical considerations raised by Gilbert Ryle and others. The core of the essay articulates an account of moral expertise that draws on work on expertise in empirical moral psychology, and develops an analogy between moral expertise and linguistic expertise. The account holds that expertise is contrastive, so that a person is an expert relative to a particular contrast. Further, expertise is domain specific and characterized by “automatic” behavior and judgment. Some disagreements in the literature regarding moral expertise are diagnosed as being due to failures to adequately distinguish different ways in which someone can be a moral expert. For example, expertise in action does not imply expertise in judgment or analysis.



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Julia Driver
University of Texas at Austin

References found in this work

Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence, and the future.John Mikhail - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143 –152.
Seeing and Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):121-124.
Theory of Justice.John Rawls - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (18):556-557.

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