Speaker’s meaning and non-cancellability

Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (1):117-138 (2013)
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Abstract

This article intends to reveal the unity between intention and other Gricean notions of signification, cancellability, and context. We argue that the total signification of an utterance is ultimately determined by speaker’s intention. We start with Grice’s conception of meaningNN and then proceed to argue that what is actually meant is hard to cancel without rendering the whole utterance self-contradictory. It is noted that cancelling p be differentiated from correcting p. It is also noted that contextual factors do not bear upon implicatures though a hearer or an analyst relies heavily on them for inference or interpretation. We suggest that any Gricean account of meaning be ontologically clear that it is the speaker’s intention that we are really invoking and consequently capture the metaphysics of meaning in order to remove the fallacy that the meaning of an utterance is its interpretation.

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