Abstract
I sketch a version of the right to the city (RTTC) that is (a) feasible, (b) generic, and so (c) broadly amenable to many of its adherents. This right, I suggest, entails special sorts of responsibilities or obligations for architects and others tending to our built environment and the spaces—especially public space—so structured and defined. Along the way, I provide a brief account of some historical motivations for embracing the right to the city, as well as reasons for endorsing my generic account. Typical reasons for supporting a right to the city are grounded in traditional rights considerations: for one, benefits of urban life point to a positive right, along the lines of an entitlement; and for another, dangers and impediments to life—and quality of life—in the city point to a negative right, along the lines of freedoms from harm and liberties to voluntary engagements. How all this has a particularly urban focus and character, and how such a right or rights translate into specifically architectural responsibilities, depends at least in part on the sorts of things cities are and how they are constituted.