Informational realism

Abstract

What is the ultimate nature of reality? This paper defends an answer in terms of informational realism (IR). It does so in three stages. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable by using the methodology of the levels of abstractions. It follows that OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that OSR is also plausible, because not all related objects are logically prior to all relational structures. The relation of difference is at least as fundamental as (because constitutive of) any relata. Third, it is suggested that an ontology of structural objects for OSR can reasonably be developed in terms of informational objects, and that Object Oriented Programming provides a flexible and powerful methodology with which to clarify and make precise the concept of “informational object”. The outcome is informational realism, the view that the world is the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other..

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
937 (#23,701)

6 months
205 (#15,120)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Luciano Floridi
Yale University

Citations of this work

Against digital ontology.Luciano Floridi - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):151 - 178.
Group privacy: a defence and an interpretation.Luciano Floridi - 2016 - In Bart van der Sloot, Luciano Floridi & Linnet Taylor (eds.), Group privacy. Springer Verlag.
Information ethics: a reappraisal.Luciano Floridi - 2008 - Ethics and Information Technology 10 (2–3):189–204.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What is structural realism?James Ladyman - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.
The Structuralist Conception of Objects.Anjan Chakravartty - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):867-878.
Structural realism and the meaning of theoretical terms.Grover Maxwell - 1970 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4:181-192.
Is structure not enough?Ioannis Votsis - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):879-890.
Scribbling on the blank sheet: Eddington's structuralist conception of objects.Steven French - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (2):227-259.

View all 7 references / Add more references