Abstract

This paper contributes to the debate in the ethics of social robots on how or whether to treat social robots morally by way of considering a novel perspective on the moral relations between human interactants and social robots. This perspective is significant as it allows us to circumnavigate debates about the (im)possibility of robot consciousness and moral patiency (debates which often slow down discussion on the ethics of HRI), thus allowing us to address actual and urgent current ethical issues in relation to human-robot interaction. The paper considers the different ways in which human interactants may be moral patients in the context of interaction with social robots: robots as conduits of human moral action towards human moral patients; humans as moral patients to the actions of robots; and human interactants as moral patients of their own agential moral actions towards social robots. This third perspective is the focal point of the paper. The argument is that due to perceived robot consciousness, and the possibility that the immoral treatment of social robots may morally harm human interactants, there is a unique moral relation between humans and social robots wherein human interactants are both the moral agents of their actions towards robots, as well as the actual moral patients of those agential moral actions towards robots. Robots, however, are no more than perceived moral patients. This discussion further adds to debates in the context of robot moral status, and the consideration of the moral treatment of robots in the context of human-robot interaction.