Ethics and Modality

Dissertation, Stanford University (2002)
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Abstract

Ethics and Modality calls for a reevaluation of standard views of modality. I argue that, instead of understanding de re modal talk as tracking the modal properties of things in themselves, we must recognize the importance of prior conceptual priorities and interests in shaping our de re modal judgments. A consequence of this reevaluation is that de re modal claims are indeterminate in that there can be disagreement over a claim without either side having made any factual, definitional or logical mistake. According to the standard view, necessities of identity are among the most secure of de re modalities. I show how determinations of whether Hesperus is Phosphorus, or Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde can be disputed without either side falling into error. Disagreements are often ended by identifying a mistake underlying one or other of the opposing views, but indeterminacy undermines the chances for such principled resolution of disagreements concerning de re modal judgments. ;This reevaluation has important practical ramifications. I argue that the notion of loss, which has great ethical and legal significance, relies on a de re modal analysis. De re modal indeterminacy threatens our ability to defend those commonplace ethical and legal judgments that rely on the modally grounded notion of loss. It is possible for disputants to agree on all relevant facts, on the concepts being deployed, on logical principles and even on matters of ethical theory, and yet still, because of modal indeterminacy, find nothing to resolve their disagreement over an alleged loss. This is troubling when we allege that an act has resulted in a loss in order to justify moral condemnation, demands for compensation and the imposition of punishment. I outline some possible responses to these difficulties. Some options preserve a notion of loss, however I do not find these conservative responses promising. I argue that abandoning commonsense ideas about compensation and doing without the notion of loss can preserve what really matters in our everyday ethical and legal thinking.

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Mark Edward Greene
University of Delaware

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