Rule consistency

Law and Philosophy 19 (3):369-390 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper develops the theory that a set of rules is consistent if it is not possible that (1) the conditions of the rules in the set are all satisfied, (2) there is no exception to either one of the rules, and (3) the consequences of the rules are incompatible. To this purpose the notion of consistency is generalised to make it cover rules and is relativised to some background of constraints.This theory is formalised by means of Rule Logic, in which rules are treated as constraints on the possible worlds in which they exist. Rule Logic itself is introduced by giving a model-theory for it. It is characterised by means of constraints on worlds that are possible according to Rule Logic.

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Jaap Hage
Leiden University

Citations of this work

A model of juridical acts: part 1: the world of law. [REVIEW]Jaap Hage - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 19 (1):23-48.

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References found in this work

A functional taxonomy of normative conflict.H. Hamner Hill - 1987 - Law and Philosophy 6 (2):227-247.
Legal Validity Qua Specific Mode of Existence.Dick W. P. Ruiter - 1997 - Law and Philosophy 16 (5):479-505.
Legal validity qua specific mode of existence.Dick W. P. Ruiter - 1997 - Law and Philosophy 16 (5):479 - 505.

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