(Mis-)Interpretations of the Theory of Relativity – Considerations on How They Arise and How to Analyze Them

In Chiara Russo Krauss & Luigi Laino (eds.), Philosophers and Einstein's Relativity: The Early Philosophical Reception of the Relativistic Revolution. Springer Verlag. pp. 1-33 (2023)
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Abstract

During Einstein’s lifetime, the special and general theories of relativity were quite frequently interpreted by philosophers. Most of these interpretations actually were misinterpretations. Even today interpretative statements about relativity theory are often false or highly misleading. Why is this so? In my Ph.D. dissertation (Hentschel 1990a), I analyzed (mis)interpretations by 10 different philosophical schools active in the early twentieth century which widely differed in their approaches, emphasis and blind spots. Many of these interpreters – including philosophers of high standing such as Ernst Cassirer, Moritz Schlick or Joseph Petzoldt – had studied the theory intensely and many even had close contact with Einstein himself or with one of the members of his “protective belt” of close friends and allies. Rather than declaring all of these (mis)interpreters as either luminaries or idiots (which would be implausible, if not downright silly), I show structurally how these misunderstandings arose and why they were kind of unavoidable, even for highly qualified and often well-informed interpreters. More popular texts about relativity theory were often second-order interpretations of these first-order accounts, thus multiplying the first-order errors of misinterpretations. I will give a few characteristic examples but my focus will rather be on structural characteristics of these misinterpretations. I will discuss how to analyze them historically by means of interpretational frames. A link will also be made to Ludwik Fleck’s thesis that socially and cognitively stabilized “thought collectives” (“Denkkollektive”) exert strong constraints on human thinking and interpretation (“Denkzwang”). My concept of interpretational frames is one method to formalize and analyze the complex interrelations between different assumptions and inferences within such a frame of thinking (“Denkstil”). Semantic frames and word clouds are also discussed as alternative approaches but both are discarded as unsuitable for the purpose of reconstructing interpretative frames.

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Prof. Dr. Klaus Hentschel
Universität Stuttgart

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