Abstract

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in pragmatism, especially that of John Dewey. Pragmatism has been embraced as a distinctively American via media, capable of bridging the contemporary divide between philosophy-as-cultural-criticism and philosophy-as-fundamental science. Indeed, the avowal by certain prominent philosophers of pragmatic commitments has been so widespread as to earn them the title of "neopragmatists." On one central issue, however, the interpretations by these philosophers of the classical pragmatists, especially Dewey, has served to place them in opposing camps. This is the issue of whether Dewey's views on truth and reality determine him to be a realist or antirealist, and whether these views could legitimately serve as foundations for contemporary "neopragmatism." For example, two prominent neopragmatists, Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, have taken quite opposite stands on this issue. Rorty derives from Dewey an antirealistic position, while Putnam's is markedly realistic. ;It is my view that neither of these neopragmatist approaches are legitimate derivations from Dewey's work. As I see it, the effect of his proposals regarding truth and reality was to undercut the entire realism/antirealism controversy. Dewey prevents such meta-philosophical dualisms in his philosophy by taking as fundamental a starting point which explicitly refuses to equate knowledge and experience. The metaphysics which follow from this starting point cannot be placed within the domain of the realism/antirealism controversy. In this dissertation I argue that Putnam and Rorty misuse Dewey's metaphysical platforms to their own ends, all the while sustaining--under the label "pragmatism"--dualisms which Dewey fought to dissolve. The larger importance of my argument lies in the fact that Dewey's position is more original and, indeed, more defensible than the neopragmatist positions derived from it