Abstract

The truth-functional conditional compound P→Q that is named, as material implication, and is equivalent to the truth functional and, has made satisfactory results in the complex mathematical arguments. Were the ancient logicians aware of it? This is the question that its answer can influence many comparative discussions in different areas of Ancient and Modern logic. The central aim of this paper is to review different answers to this question and evaluate them. Some believe that the Etefaghieh is the same as material implication. Some believe that the definition of Mottaseleh is the same as the definition of material implication. Other logicians believe that the condition of truth of Mottaseleh is the same as the condition of truth of material implication. But, for others the awareness of Avicenna from material implication and its truth condition is subject to debate. The truth condition of Ettefaghieh-áám, for some logicians, is the same as the truth condition of material implication. Ultimately after analyzing these views, the aim of this paper is to bring to light the fact that material implication and its truth condition is different from those of conditionals explained in ancient logic, and each system; ancient logic or modern logic is independent from the other.