Abstract

Mencius is well-known for his discussion of the relationship between yi (righteousness) and li (benefit/profit). According to a traditional interpretation, Mencius believes that although actions driven by yi can sometimes produce li as good results, li should never be taken as the reason for deciding to act from yi. However, according to a more recently developed consequentialist interpretation, Mencius holds that people should act from yi precisely because this is more effective in producing li than acting with the intention of seeking li. This chapter argues against the consequentialist interpretation while reinforcing the traditional one. First, this chapter demonstrates that Mencius not only believes in yi’s possession of intrinsic moral value but also disapproves of the reasoning process that the consequentialist interpretation attributes to him. After this, the chapter re-examines the traditional interpretation in the context of Mencian moral cultivation, through which some hitherto unaddressed problems faced by the traditional interpretation will be solved.