Abstract

Naturalized metaphysics questions the epistemic legitimacy of the traditional methods of metaphysics and proposes that a metaphysics motivated by science will do better. The veracity of these two core commitments of naturalized metaphysics have been much debated over to last two decades. Instead of continuing this debate, this thesis investigates from a methodological perspective what follows if one takes these two claims for granted. The thesis argues (1) that, despite claims to the contrary, naturalized metaphysics has no resources with which to answer the concerns that the logical positivists had about metaphysics; (2) that naturalized metaphysics – contrary to what might be expected – is hospitable to certain kinds of resistance to science from metaphysicians; (3) that naturalized metaphysics cannot both be a genuine exercise in metaphysics and inherit the epistemic legitimacy of science; and (4) that even the naturalized metaphysics of fundamental science could have consequences for social ontology. In addition to these concrete interventions, the thesis gives a comprehensive account of the foundational claims of naturalized metaphysics including how they relate to those of other naturalisms and other recent trends in metametaphysics such as neo-Carnapian metaphysics.