World-indexed Descriptivism and an Illusory Problem of Empty Names

Philosophical Analysis 14:189-196 (2006)
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Abstract

Stuart Brock criticizes two kinds of descriptivist views developed in response to Saul Kripke’s modal argument. In this paper, I raise an objection to Brock’s criticism of the world-indexed view by arguing that he fails to distinguish between ∃x(AF!x) and A∃x(F!x).

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Seahwa Kim
Ewha Womans University

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