Slurs Are Directives

Philosophers' Imprint 19:1-28 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent work on the semantics and pragmatics of slurs has explored a variety of ways of explaining their potential to derogate, with the most popular family of approaches appealing to either: (i), the doxastic or evaluative attitudes or commitments expressed by — or (ii), the propositions concerning such attitudes or commitments semantically or pragmatically communicated by — the speakers who use them. I begin by arguing that no such speaker-oriented approach can be correct. I then propose an alternative treatment of slurs, according to which they are semantically associated with both descriptive and directive content. On the view I defend, when speakers use slurs, they simultaneously propose to add an at-issue proposition to the conversational common ground and issue a not-at-issue directive to their interlocutors to adopt a derogatory perspective toward members of the targeted group. This proposal both avoids the problems faced by other accounts and opens up a novel way of thinking about the phenomenon of appropriation.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,779

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-11-13

Downloads
121 (#147,222)

6 months
19 (#182,589)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini
Rutgers University - Newark

Citations of this work

Covert Mixed Quotation.Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - 2024 - Semantics and Pragmatics 17 (5):1-52.
Hate Speech.Luvell Anderson & Michael Randall Barnes - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Slurs, Pejoratives, and Hate Speech.Mihaela Popa-Wyatt - 2020 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references