Philosophical Studies 153 (3):335 – 49 (2011)

Authors
Justin Klocksiem
New Mexico State University
Abstract
Several prominent ethical philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that there exist instances or types of value that are of crucial moral significance but which cannot legitimately be compared with one another. Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker, for example, argue that it can sometimes be rational to regret having chosen the all-things-considered better of two alternatives, and that this sense of regret entails that the goodness of the worse option is not made up for by and is therefore incommensurable with that of the better. Joseph Raz and others have made similar points. In this paper, I propose a theory of value that is monistic in that it countenances just one sort of morally crucial value, but pluralistic in that several distinct properties bearer this value. I then explain how this view avoids incommensurable values without doing violence to the core intuitions that seemed to necessitate them, and how it fits into a larger conception of morality, right conduct, and moral psychology.
Keywords Incommensurability  Value  Pluralism  Kekes  Raz  Stocker  Moore
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9513-4
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 13 (3):7-9.

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Citations of this work BETA

Value Pluralism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Monism and Pluralism About Value.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-157.
Two Kinds of Value Pluralism.Miles Tucker - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (3):333-346.
All-Things-Considered,’ ‘Better-Than,’ And Sports Rankings‘.S. Seth Bordner - 2016 - ‘All-Things-Considered,’ ‘Better-Than,’ and Sports Rankings:1-18.

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