Relative Ontology and Method of Scientific Theory of Consciousness

RUDN Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):316-331 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Consciousness is defined as operating with the meanings of representations, which are what arises in mind under the influence of a stimulus (primary representations) as well as what arises as a result of their transformation (secondary, combined representations). In a first approximation, a representation is expressed by words. The concept of “representation” is a special case of the concept of “information-certainty”, which is the result of distinction. Any distinction is a distinction by a specific attribute and representation is the value of the attribute. In relative ontology, distinction is an essential condition of being that is formalized quantitatively through the operation of ontological subtraction, which is a quantitative expression of representation in relation to consciousness. The finite set of representations for one attribute can always be sorted in ascending order of this attribute values. In the order constructed, each representation corresponds to an attribute number, the only difference of which from a number in mathematics is that the one is always associated with a specific attribute, and the other is not associated with any attribute. The meaning of a representation expressed by an attribute number has a place in an ordered quantitative series of other representations of the same attribute, which is the basis of distinction. Operating with meanings is operating with attributive numbers-meanings. This method of the meaning describing is called the relative method. All operations with the meanings of representations are performed in a multidimensional cognitive space. Each axis of the cognitive space corresponds to an attribute by which representations differ. On each axis there are attribute numbers corresponding to the meanings of representations for the attribute. This approach is a quantitative method of describing of all experimental processes of consciousness, which allows to build a scientific, i.e. quantitative, theory of consciousness with laws written down in a quantitative way. Based on this, it is possible to construct a quantitative calculation of this theory predictions. Such a prediction allows to make an accurate (unambiguous) experimental verification. Due to the quantitative way of describing the operation of meanings, such a theory of consciousness is easily modeled in information technologies, since the latter are also based on the numerical nature of all their processes. The main difference between the relative method and the vast majority of methods using information technologies for text processing is that the relative method, firstly, is not statistical, and secondly, conveys the meaning of the text fully and most adequately. The relative method is effective in operating not only with text data, but also with any data of a different nature, for example, with video data, audio data.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,891

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ontology of Semantics in Information Technologies.P. M. Kolychev - 2020 - RUDN Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):262-275.
Quantity and Quality: Some Aspects of Measurement.Arnold Koslow - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:183 - 198.
An Information Processing View of Fringe Consciousness.Jon May - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-24

Downloads
2 (#1,823,898)

6 months
2 (#1,446,842)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Computing machinery and intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.
Ontology of Semantics in Information Technologies.P. M. Kolychev - 2020 - RUDN Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):262-275.

Add more references