Kant on Autonomy and Moral Evil

In Freedom and reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard. New York: Oxford University Press (2006)
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Abstract

This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s approach to moral evil. It lays out an apparent problem with Kant’s account of the connection between the freedom required for moral responsibility and the freedom of rational autonomy: that if the former requires the latter, then imputable moral evil is impossible.

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Michelle Kosch
Cornell University

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