Freedom and reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard

New York: Oxford University Press (2006)
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Michelle Kosch examines the conceptions of free will and the foundations of ethics in the work of Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard. She seeks to understand the history of German idealism better by looking at it through the lens of these issues, and to understand Kierkegaard better by placing his thought in this context. Kosch argues for a new interpretation of Kierkegaard's theory of agency, that Schelling was a major influence and Kant a major target of criticism, and that both the theory and the criticisms are highly relevant to contemporary debates.



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Freedom against Reason: Schelling's Freiheitsschrift and Later Work

This chapter examines the post-1809 change in Schelling’s view of the system-freedom problem, shows the change to arise from consideration of the problem of freedom for evil, and introduces the main ideas of the late positive philosophy.

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Author's Profile

Michelle Kosch
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Kierkegaard on Belief and Credence.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.
Resolving to Believe: Kierkegaard’s Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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