Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard

Oxford University Press (2006)
Michelle Kosch examines the conceptions of free will and the foundations of ethics in the work of Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard. She seeks to understand the history of German idealism better by looking at it through the lens of these issues, and to understand Kierkegaard better by placing his thought in this context. Kosch argues for a new interpretation of Kierkegaard's theory of agency, that Schelling was a major influence and Kant a major target of criticism, and that both the theory and the criticisms are highly relevant to contemporary debates.
Keywords Free will and determinism History  Ethics, Modern
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Reprint years 2009, 2010
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Call number BJ1461.K67 2006
ISBN(s) 9780199289110   0199289115   9780199577941  
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Roe Fremstedal (2011). The Concept of the Highest Good in Kierkegaard and Kant. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):155-171.
Patrick Stokes (2011). Uniting the Perspectival Subject: Two Approaches. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):23-44.
Michelle Kosch (2008). What Abraham Couldn't Say. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):59-78.

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