Abstract

This dissertation is a study in the comparative formal ontology of fiction. We deal primarily with the alternative ontological frameworks of Alexius Meinong and early Bertrand Russell as each appears in or has influenced the development of intensional logics reconstructing their basic insights. Our aim is to develop an early Russellian account of fiction--an account that can handle the semantics of stories about any manner of "object" of thought, purple gnomes, "round-squares", paradoxical sets, or anything else one might imagine. We develop such an account of fiction from within the type-free intensional logic HST*D), which is a theory of nominalized predicates formulated by Professor Nino Cocchiarella. ;Our Russellian theory is compared with reconstructions of Meinongian views, for example, Terence Parsons' Nonexistent Objects, and Edward Zalta'sObjects. These frameworks present intensional logics which formalize alternative approaches to a Meinongian theory of objects; the former adopts a distinction in kinds of predicates, the latter distinguishes modes of predication. It is found that the valuable applications of both Meinongian frameworks are captured in our early Russellian theory--and without the oddities of Meinongianism. ;The Meinogian regards all reference in our common place intentional activities such as planning, the framing of scientific hypotheses, story telling, deceiving, and the like, as semantically on par. He thus introduces nonexistents, both possible and impossible, as legitimate concrete objects "before the mind". In contrast, our Russellian account treats "reference to the nonexistent" as a part of a general account of nominalization to the linguistic expressions we have for denoting concepts which purport to refer. In this way, we provide new insights for resolving perplexing issues involved in formulating the semantics of fiction, and of natural language in general. It is revealed by comparing our Russellian approach with Hector-Neri Castaneda's Guise Theory, that the representation of the "content" of thought requires only that we represent the conceptual activity of thought, and not that we postulate objects, intentional and otherwise, which are literally "before" the mind. Thus, our Russellian account has many important applications for the development of a general semantics for natural language, and for the philosophy of mind