Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):33-43 (2000)
Skeptical theses in general claim that we cannot know what we think we know. Content skepticism in particular claims that we cannot know the contents of our own occurrent thoughtsat least not in the way we think we can. I argue that an externalist account of content does engender a mild form of content skepticism but that the condition is no real cause for concern. Content externalism forces us to reevaluate some of our assumptions about introspective knowledge, but it is compatible with privileged access and the distinctive epistemic character of introspective judgments
|Keywords||Content Epistemology Knowledge Scepticism|
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