Spinoza et Darwin, un héritage véritablement conceptuel?

Philosophiques 45 (2):445-459 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Vincent Legeay | : L’article entend proposer un critère d’évaluation d’un héritage conceptuel possible de Spinoza à Darwin, mettant en avant qu’il ne suffit pas de mobiliser des notions communes entre les deux auteurs. Pour ce faire, il commence par restituer une série de comparaisons contemporaines dans cette voie, pour ensuite tenter d’expliciter ce que Darwin entend lui-même demander à la mobilisation de certaines de ses notions héritées. C’est alors sur le critère de la différence individuelle que l’analyse permettra de dégager un schéma conceptuel suffisamment probant pour dire que Darwin reprend une pensée historiquement située. Enfin, après avoir étudié une divergence conceptuelle significative dans cette reprise, l’analyse montre que la voie darwinienne laisse délibérément de côté une dimension ouverte de l’analyse spinoziste concernant le concept de supériorité. | : A mere succession of notions through time is ineffective in order to show a real and deep theoretical relationship between two authors of two different times. This article is designed to provide a strong evidence of a conceptual inheritance from Spinoza to Darwin. It starts with a comparison between different declarations of a contemporary author who have lately made a similar attempt, and follows by a forward analysis of Darwin’s own views and declarations concerning his using of several notions close to those of Spinoza. It is therefore advocated that it is mainly the concept of difference that ensures an authentic inheritance of a conceptual scheme between the dutch and english thinkers. After proving that Darwin is accurately aware of that historical theoretical framework, the analysis will eventually consider that the naturalist left aside one of Spinoza’s biological outbreaks concerning the notion of the individual superiority.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,612

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-01-24

Downloads
11 (#351,772)

6 months
1 (#1,912,481)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references