Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542 (2013)

Authors
William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
Keywords Mind–body problem  Cartesian dualism  Substance dualism  Property dualism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9867-x
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References found in this work BETA

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.

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