Decir la "persona" según Escoto (un intento de interpretación)

Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 14:11-31 (2007)
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Abstract

In Scotus the person is treated in an intelectual atmosphere in which has already been enhanced a considerable effort intelectual in views to an understanding and clarification of what is the person. The author of this work on Scotus, professor emeritus of Antonianum of Rome, intends to make understand the originality of the grief escotista on the person. For it, it is about creating the place in which makes sense speak of person, as Escoto. This place is not other but that in the one that the ontological language is overcome. The person, indeed, indicates and she says something that surpasses and she is added the intellectual constituted individual or the individual of rational nature. In consequence, Prof. Manzano pursues and it indicates the roads from Scotus to this original reality that is the one of being person. These roads are, in short, the road toward the person’s understanding like «an absolute event that happens», the road of the person’s understanding like «absolute independence» and the road of the person’s understanding like «incommunicable existence». At the end, the author treats the scotish dialectic on the question of if the person is carácter of being something positive real, although not ontological, or she is merely somethig relational. In this lasta case, it will be abolut a «relationship» extremely original and diverse of the nature of the relationship as predicament.

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