A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums

Constitutional Political Economy 15:359-370 (2004)
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Abstract

This paper concerns the political economy of budget balances and focuses on fiscal referendums. It specifically suggests - on the basis of theoretical arguments -that any analysis of fiscal referendums must take their spending thresholds into account. Thus, it claims that mandatory fiscal referendums can impose greater constraints than optional fiscal referendums. In conclusion, various recommendations based on this observation are proposed.

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