Fictional propositions and the unprovability of consistency

Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):201-210 (2006)
Abstract
We introduce an epistemic version of validity and completeness of first order logic, based on the notions of ideal agent and fictional model. We then show how the perspective here considered may help to solve an epistemic puzzle arising from Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
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