Abstract

In the most recent debate of phenomenological as well as analytical provenance, Husserl’s reflection, although pioneer regarding ethics, seems to suffer of a general depreciation enrooted in his supposed excess rationalism. The husserlian ethics would remain subjected to the dominance of a logico-objectifying reason, which appears to be the fundamental dimension of intentionality. The wide range of life-experiences would then be crushed by the hegemony of objectifying acts. Are we really sure? Our contribution will rather consist in raising the originality of Husserl’s method which lastly to reconcile two seemingly contradictory requirements: the autonomy of ethical and its dependence towards logical reason. We shall notice thus a progressive dissociatoon from Brentano’s teaching leading to an overall revision of intentionality. If anything such as rationalism exists in Husserl’s thinking, it can only be asserted on the condition of a radical criticism of the concept of “representation” – from where, as we shall see, emerges a newly articulated relationship between “object” and “value”.