The soap bubble: Phenomenal state or perceptual system dynamics?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):420-421 (2003)
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Abstract

The Gestalt Bubble model describes a subjective phenomenal experience (what is seen) without taking into account the extraphenomenal constraints of perceptual experience (why it is seen as it is). If it intends to be an explanatory model, then it has to include either stimulus or neural constraints, or both.

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10.1017/s0140525x03340099

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