Abstract

The paper analyzes whether human nature can be the foundation of human rights. To this end, in the first part, the concept of the nature of an object is considered. The author considers three understandings of the concept “nature of X”: (1) the set of necessary (or essential) properties of all X-es, (2) ideal or pattern, which X-es can or should strive to and (3) a statistically dominant tendency (or tendencies) characterizing all X-es as a genre although not always characterizing every individual X. The J. Wroblewski’s idea of distinguishing factual, ethical and logical understanding of nature is introduced. These understandings are then analyzed, especially when it comes to the question of whether they are descriptive or normative, In the second part, each of the accounts is applied to considerations of human nature. Next, the author considers whether any of these conceptions of human nature can be recognized as the foundation of human rights. In the following part, the author examines the concept of ‘human dignity’ and its relation to human nature. Finally, the paper shows which understandings of human nature can entail human rights.