Kant on animal and human pleasure

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):518-540 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Feeling, for any animal, is a faculty of comparing objects or representations with regard to whether they promote its vital powers or hinder them. But whereas these comparisons presuppose a species-concept in non-rational animals, nature has not equipped the human being with a universal principle or life-form that would determine what agrees or disagrees with it. As humans, we must determine our mode of life for ourselves. Contrary to other interpretations, I argue that this places the human capacity for pleasure and displeasure outside of nature and in a realm of spirit.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-11-25

Downloads
104 (#172,830)

6 months
12 (#243,143)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Kant on Moral Respect.Anastasia Berg - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (4):730-760.
Kant on Vital Forces and the Analogy with Life.Tyke Nunez - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 961-972.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations