An argument from transtemporal identity for subject-body dualism

In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press (2009)
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Martine Nida-Rümelin
Université de Fribourg
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You Are An Animal.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.
Endurance, Dualism, Temporal Passage, and Intuitions.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):851-862.

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