" Lar Philosophie der Demokratie: Arrow-Theorem, Liberalität und strukturelle Normen"

Analyse & Kritik 13 (2):184-203 (1991)
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Abstract

The paradoxes and dilemmas of social choice theory can be taken as an argument against a certain view of democracy: For the identity theory democracy represents a collective actor standing for aggregated individual interests. According to a second model of society, democracy has its normative basis in structural traits of interaction and cooperation. Within the formal theory of politics both the Arrow-Theorem and the Liberal Paradox undermine the identity theory and give us reasons for the second, the normative theory which takes democracy as being constituted by structural rules.

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Julian Nida-Rümelin
Humboldt-University, Berlin

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