Die Logik des Neides Eine kantianische Analyse

Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 77 (2):152-172 (2023)
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Abstract

The phenomenon of envy has mostly been analyzed as a special form of a subject???s emotion or feeling. However, its rational structure and moral-psychological dimension have rarely been analyzed in detail. In this paper I argue that envy is not only an unpleasant complex emotion but rather a highly interesting attitude and strategy, which consists in finding reasons for denying another person the recognition she actually deserves. Envious people systematically confuse envy with justified moral resentment. This rationalizing denial of recognition is due to a form of rational self-deception by the envious person. I will analyze this strategy of envy in more detail by referring to John Rawls???s conception of justice and Immanuel Kant???s concept of rationalizing. I shall conclude by arguing that envy is characterized by a paradoxical structure, which consists in the fact that we never consciously and willingly envy, so that the speech act “I envy you” implies a performative contradiction.

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Jörg Noller
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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