Reference and perspective in intuitionistic logics

Abstract
What an intuitionist may refer to with respect to a given epistemic state depends not only on that epistemic state itself but on whether it is viewed concurrently from within, in the hindsight of some later state, or ideally from a standpoint “beyond” all epistemic states (though the latter perspective is no longer strictly intuitionistic). Each of these three perspectives has a different—and, in the last two cases, a novel—logic and semantics. This paper explains these logics and their semantics and provides soundness and completeness proofs. It provides, moreover, a critique of some common versions of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic and suggests ways of modifying them to take account of the perspective-relativity of reference.
Keywords Intuitionistic logic  Intuitionism  Constructivism  Reference  Kripke semantics
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Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.1007/s10849-006-9024-z
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References found in this work BETA
Proof Methods for Modal and Intuitionistic Logics.Melvin Fitting - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (3):855-856.
Semantical Investigations in Heyting's Intuitionistic Logic.Dov M. Gabbay - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):824-824.
Intuitionistic Logic, Model Theory and Forcing.Melvin Fitting - 1969 - Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co..
The Foundations of Intuitionistic Mathematics.Stephen Cole Kleene - 1965 - Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co..

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Citations of this work BETA
Truth as an Epistemic Ideal.John Nolt - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):203 - 237.

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