Results for 'Intuitionism'

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  1. Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.
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  2. Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations.Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Ethical Intuitionism was the dominant moral theory in Britain for much of the 18th, 19th and the first third of the twentieth century. However, during the middle decades of the twentieth century ethical intuitionism came to be regarded as utterly untenable. It was thought to be either empty, or metaphysically and epistemologically extravagant, or both. This hostility led to a neglect of the central intuitionist texts, and encouraged the growth of a caricature of intuitionism that could easily (...)
     
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  3. Revisionary Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
    I argue that, given evidence of the factors that tend to distort our intuitions, ethical intuitionists should disown a wide range of common moral intuitions, and that they should typically give preference to abstract, formal intuitions over more substantive ethical intuitions. In place of the common sense morality with which intuitionism has traditionally allied, the suggested approach may lead to a highly revisionary normative ethics.
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  4. Moral Intuitionism and Disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.
    According to moral intuitionism, at least some moral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies that moral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplace moral disagreements in which both agents have equally good phenomenological credentials supporting their (...)
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  5. Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
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  6. Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb.Crispin Wright - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Clarendon Press. pp. 38--60.
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  7. Intuitionism Disproved?Timothy Williamson - 1982 - Analysis 42 (4):203--7.
    Perennial philosophers' hopes are unlikely victims of swift, natural deduction. Yet anti-realism has been thought one. Not hoping for anti-realism myself I here show it, lest it be underestimated, to survive the following argument, adapted from W. D.Hart pp. 156, 164-5; he credits first publication to Fitch).
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  8. Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning.Hanno Sauer - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):708-721.
    Rationalism about the psychology of moral judgment holds, among other things, that the justifying moral reasons we have for our judgments are also the causally effective reasons for why we make those judgments. This can be called the ‘effectiveness’-thesis regarding moral reasoning. The theory that best exemplifies the thesis is the traditional conscious reasoning-paradigm. Current empirical moral psychology, however, poses a serious challenge to this thesis: it argues that in fact, emotional reactions are necessary and sufficient to account for moral (...)
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  9. Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
    In the recent metaethical literature there has been significant interest in the prospects for what I am denoting ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’: the view that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferential justification for first-order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual experiences, e.g., Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010, Vayrynen 2008. If true, it promises to constitute an independent a posteriori intuitionist epistemology, providing an alternative to intuitionist accounts which posit a priori intuition and/or emotion as sources of non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs. (...)
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  10. Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics.Elizabeth Tropman - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1):31-45.
    Sensibility theorists such as John McDowell have argued that once we appreciate certain similarities between moral values and secondary qualities, a new meta-ethical position might emerge, one that avoids the alleged difficulties with moral intuitionism and non-cognitivism. The aim of this paper is to examine the meta-ethical prospects of this secondary-quality analogy. Of particular concern will be the extent to which McDowell’s comparison of values to secondary qualities supports a viewpoint unique from that of the moral intuitionist. Once we (...)
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  11.  86
    Intuitionism an Introduction.A. Heyting - 1956 - North-Holland.
  12. Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments.Mark van Roojen - forthcoming - In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
    Over the last decade there have been various attempts to use empirical data about people’s dispositions to choose to undermine various moral positions by arguing that our judgements about what to do are unreliable. Usually they are directed at non-consequentialists by consequentialists, but they have also been directed at all moral theories by skeptics about morality. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has been one of the leading proponents of such general skepticism. He has argued that empirical results particularly undermine intuitionist moral epistemology. This (...)
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  13. Brouwerian Intuitionism.Michael Detlefsen - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):501-534.
    The aims of this paper are twofold: firstly, to say something about that philosophy of mathematics known as 'intuitionism' and, secondly, to fit these remarks into a more general message for the philosophy of mathematics as a whole. What I have to say on the first score can, without too much inaccuracy, be compressed into two theses. The first is that the intuitionistic critique of classical mathematics can be seen as based primarily on epistemological rather than on meaning-theoretic considerations. (...)
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  14. Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Naturalism.Nicholas Sturgeon - 2002 - In Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. Oxford University Press.
  15.  19
    Intuitionism.A. Heyting - 1956 - Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co..
  16. Against Intuitionism: Constructive Mathematics is Part of Classical Mathematics. [REVIEW]W. W. Tait - 1983 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (2):173 - 195.
  17. Intuitionism.David Kaspar - 2012 - Continuum.
    Thinking about morality -- Story of contemporary intuitionism -- Moral knowledge -- New challenges to intuitionism -- Grounds of morality -- Right and the good reconsidered -- Intuitionism's rivals -- Being moral: how and why.
     
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  18. Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique.Danny Frederick - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):631-47.
    Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian ad hominen attacks. Intuitionists try to avoid that by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. That does not avoid the problem. It (...)
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  19.  13
    Intuitionism As Generalization.Fred Richman - 1990 - Philosophia Mathematica (1-2):124-128.
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  20. Renewing Moral Intuitionism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.
    According to moral intuitionism, moral properties are objective, but our cognitions of them are not always based on premises. In this paper, I develop a novel version of moral intuitionism and argue that this new intuitionism is worthy of closer attention. The intuitionistic theory I propose, while inspired by the early twentieth-century intuitionism of W. D. Ross, avoids the alleged errors of his view. Furthermore, unlike Robert Audi's contemporary formulation of intuitionism, my theory has the (...)
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  21.  47
    A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability.Preston J. Werner - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1791-1809.
    According to a posteriori ethical intuitionism, perceptual experiences can provide non-inferential justification for at least some moral beliefs. Moral epistemology, for the defender of AEI, is less like the epistemology of math and more like the epistemology of tables and chairs. One serious threat to AEI comes from the phenomenon of cognitive penetration. The worry is that even if evaluative properties could figure in the contents of experience, they would only be able to do so if prior cognitive states (...)
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  22.  18
    Moderate Intuitionism.Michael Johnson & Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknown
    Recent empirical work suggests that intuitions may be less reliable than previously assumed. However, given the ubiquity of intuition in philosophical reasoning, it is tempting to give intuitions some evidential weight. This chapter develops an account called ‘moderate intuitionism’, a view whereby intuitions are generally reliable, but nonetheless capable of substantial degrees of error. Believing that the general reliability of intuition emerges from the nature of language, the chapter develops an outline for a disposition-based metasemantic theory which can ground (...)
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  23.  67
    A Cognitive–Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment.Adenekan Dedeke - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 126 (3):1-21.
    The study of moral decision-making presents to us two approaches for understanding such choices. The cognitive and the neurocognitive approaches postulate that reason and reasoning determines moral judgments. On the other hand, the intuitionist approaches postulate that automated intuitions mostly dominate moral judgments. There is a growing concern that neither of these approaches by itself captures all the key aspects of moral judgments. This paper draws on models from neurocognitive research and social-intuitionist research areas to propose an integrative cognitive–intuitive model (...)
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  24.  93
    Intuitionism Versus Degrees of Truth.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1990 - Analysis 50 (1):43 - 47.
    Putnam's intuitionist proposal for a logic of vague terms is defended. It is argued that both classical logic and the degrees of truth approach are committed to treating vague terms as having hidden precise borderlines. This is a crucial failing in a logic of vagueness. Intuitionism, because of the nature of intuitionist negation, avoids this failing.
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  25. Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment.Robert Audi - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
    This paper outlines and defends a moderate intuitionism. The point of departure is the intuitionism of W. D. Ross (1930) in The Right and the Good, conceived as ethically pluralist and epistemologically rationalist. The paper articulates a conception of self-evidence – including mediate as well as immediate kinds – appropriate to a moderate intuitionism, explores some of the resources and varieties of that position, and considers some problems and prospects for a rationalist version of intuitionism. The (...)
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  26. Intuitionism and Formalism.L. E. J. Brouwer - 1913 - Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 20:81-96.
     
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  27. Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.
    In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of our evidential grounds, that's (...)
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  28. Moral Intuitionism Defeated?Nathan Ballantyne & Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):411-422.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed and progressively refined an argument against moral intuitionism—the view on which some moral beliefs enjoy non-inferential justification. He has stated his argument in a few different forms, but the basic idea is straightforward. To start with, Sinnott-Armstrong highlights facts relevant to the truth of moral beliefs: such beliefs are sometimes biased, influenced by various irrelevant factors, and often subject to disagreement. Given these facts, Sinnott-Armstrong infers that many moral beliefs are false. What then shall we (...)
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  29.  24
    Rational Intuitionism.Philip Stratton-Lake - 2012 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 337-357.
    In this paper I give a critical overview of the views of the main Rational Intuitionists from 18th to 20th century.
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  30.  9
    Intuitionism. An Introduction.Sigekatu Kuroda - 1956 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (4):367-371.
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  31.  36
    Intuitionism and Philosophy.Carl Posy - 2005 - In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 319--355.
    After sketching the essentials of L. E. J. Brouwer’s intuitionistic mathematics—separable mathematics, choice sequences, the uniform continuity theorem, and the intuitionistic continuum—this chapter outlines the main philosophical tenets that go hand in hand with Brouwer’s technical achievements. It presents his views about general and mathematical phenomenology and shows how these views ground his positive epistemological and ontological positions and his stinging criticisms of classical mathematics and logic. The chapter then turns to intuitionistic logic and its philosophical side. It first sets (...)
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  32.  69
    Evolutionary Intuitionism: A Theory of the Origin and Nature of Moral Facts.Brian Zamulinski - 2007 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    It seems impossible that organisms selected to maximize their genetic legacy could also be moral agents in a world in which taking risks for strangers is sometimes morally laudable. Brian Zamulinski argues that it is possible if morality is an evolutionary by-product rather than an adaptation.Evolutionary Intuitionism presents a new evolutionary theory of human morality. Zamulinski explains the evolution of foundational attitudes, whose relationships to acts constitute moral facts. With foundational attitudes and the resulting moral facts in place, he (...)
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  33.  27
    Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic.Patricia Kitcher & Lorne Falkenstein - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):155.
    Wonderfully clear, scholarly, and well argued, Kant’s Intuitionism offers a bold new interpretation of the thesis of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Falkenstein reads Kant as a “formal intuitionist.” That is, he takes Kant to have maintained that the forms of intuition, space, and time were given along with sensations. They were neither preexisting representations, nor intellectual or imaginative constructions out of sensations. In this context “given” contrasts with “constructed”; subjects’ representations of space and time derived from their sensory constitutions. When (...)
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  34. Elements of Intuitionism.Michael Dummett - 1977 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a long-awaited new edition of one of the best known Oxford Logic Guides. The book gives an introduction to intuitionistic mathematics, leading the reader gently through the fundamental mathematical and philosophical concepts. The treatment of various topics, for example Brouwer's proof of the Bar Theorem, valuation systems, and the completeness of intuitionistic first-order logic, have been completely revised.
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  35.  90
    Intuitionism's Burden: Thomas Reid on the Problem of Moral Motivation.Terence Cuneo - 2008 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):21-44.
    Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable.1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely assumed that the early (...)
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  36.  34
    Ethical Intuitionism and the Emotions: Toward an Empirically Adequate Moral Sense Theory.James Sias - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):533-549.
    IntroductionEthical intuitionists have never known quite what to make of the emotions. Generally speaking, these philosophers fall into two camps: rational intuitionists and moral sense theorists. And by my lights, neither camp has been able to tell a convincing story about the exact role and significance of emotion in moral judgment. Rational intuitionists are for the most part too dismissive of the emotions, either regarding emotions as little more than distractions to moral judgment,Samuel Clarke, for instance, after naming our “faculties (...)
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  37. Varieties of Moral Intuitionism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):177-194.
    Moral intuitionism is the view that we can know or justifiably believe some moral facts directly, without inferring them from other evidence or proof. While intuitionism is frequently dismissed as implausible, the theory has received renewed interest in the literature.See Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism (London: Continuum, 2011); Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, (...)
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  38.  17
    Mathematical Intuitionism. Introduction to Proof Theory.A. G. Dragalin & E. Mendelson - 1990 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (3):1308-1309.
  39. The New Intuitionism.Jill Hernandez (ed.) - 2012 - London: Continuum.
    Since the 2004 publication of his book The Good in the Right, Robert Audi has been at the forefront of the current resurgence of interest in intuitionism – the idea that human beings have an intuitive sense of right and wrong – in ethics. The New Intuitionism brings together some of the world’s most important contemporary writers from such diverse fields as metaethics, epistemology and moral psychology to explore the latest implications of, and challenges to, Audi’s work. The (...)
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  40.  45
    Intuitionism and Conservatism.Mark T. Nelson - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (3):282-293.
    I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuition make ethical theory politically and noetically conservative. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.B. Brandt, R.M. Hare and Richard Miller.
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  41.  35
    The Intuitionist Argument.Caroline J. Simon - 1990 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):91-114.
  42. Ethical Intuitionism.P. F. Strawson - 1949 - Philosophy 24 (88):23 - 33.
    North .—What is the trouble about moral facts? When someone denies that there is an objective moral order, or asserts that ethical propositions are pseudo-propositions, cannot I refute him by saying: “You know very well that Brown did wrong in beating his wife. You know very well that you ought to keep promises. You know very well that human affection is good and cruelty bad, that many actions are wrong and some are right”? West .—Isn't the trouble about moral facts (...)
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  43.  30
    Ethical Intuitionism and Naturalism: A Reconciliation.M. B. E. Smith - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):609 - 629.
    I argue that, If one adopts a minimal naturalism (of a kind rejected by moore, Hare, "et al".), One would adopt a methodology which yields conclusions identical to that yielded by intuitionistic methodology (of a kind employed by ross, Prichard, "et al".). I dilate upon the advantages which thus accrue to each theory, And I defend my minimal naturalism against a variety of objections.
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  44.  48
    Intuitionist Logic — Subsystem of, Extension of, or Rival to, Classical Logic?Richard Sylvan - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (1):147 - 151.
    Strictly speaking, intuitionistic logic is not a modal logic. There are, after all, no modal operators in the language. It is a subsystem of classical logic, not [like modal logic] an extension of it. But... (thus Fitting, p. 437, trying to justify inclusion of a large chapter on intuitionist logic in a book that is largely about modal logics).
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  45. Conceptions of Truth in Intuitionism.Panu Raatikainen - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):131--45.
    Intuitionism’s disagreement with classical logic is standardly based on its specific understanding of truth. But different intuitionists have actually explicated the notion of truth in fundamentally different ways. These are considered systematically and separately, and evaluated critically. It is argued that each account faces difficult problems. They all either have implausible consequences or are viciously circular.
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  46.  52
    Intuitionism and Sorites.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1987 - Analysis 47 (4):179 - 183.
  47. Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - unknown
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has (...)
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  48.  10
    Sublunary Intuitionism.Charles Travis - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 55 (1):169-194.
    In "Truth" Michael Dummett presents a case for intuitionist logic as the logic of ordinary discourse. The case depends on a supposed need to make two intuitions mesh: first, that it is senseless to suppose, of any statement, that it is neither true nor false; second, that there is no guarantee, for every statement, that either there is something in the world to make it true, or there is something to make it false. This paper argues, developing a notion of (...)
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  49. A Particularist Epistemology: 'Affectual Intuitionism'. [REVIEW]Sabine Roeser - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):33-44.
    Jonathan Dancy has developed a very refined theory called ethical particularism. He has argued extensively for the metaphysical part of his position. However, the accompanying epistemology is not yet clear. In this paper I will sketch a particularist epistemology that is consistent with Dancy’s particularist metaphysics, although my approach differs in certain respects from epistemological claims Dancy has made. I will defend an epistemology that states: 1. that moral knowledge is based on intuitions and 2. that we need emotions in (...)
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  50.  7
    Anti-Intuitionism and Paraconsistency.Andreas B. M. Brunner & Walter A. Carnielli - 2005 - Journal of Applied Logic 3 (1):161-184.
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