Abstract
What follows axe the provisional conclusions reached in my thoughts about a frequently encountered, established argument for perceptual relativism. Rather than attempting the misleading task of dcfming in a sentence this doctrine - for it is so widely espoused by philosophers and Iaymcn alike that it deserves to bc called a doctrine — I shall instead elucidate it by thc common argu— ment for it that I wish to deal with, which Ishall call thc argument from differing perceptual apparatus, or ADP. Most people, myself included, encounter ADP in popular form, with the opening gambit: "Supposc a fly flew into the room objccts would appear to it totally different from the way they appear to us . . . "; or else: "Saiicnce is a function of 0nc’s environment — insects perceive sounds and colour-shades we would never pcrccivc, because they nccd this to suivivc." Generally, differences in environment and therefore in salicncc, manifest themselves in different or more or less finely-tuned sense organs. Some animals have sense organs quite different in type or rcccptivity from the traditional human "fivc SBl’1S6S”. (Other senses, such as the kinesthctic sense have, of course, been determined and added to thc traditional fivc.) The premise that can be distilled from these points is the basic empirical premise 0f ADP: different species have different perceptual apparatus, with the consequence that different classes of..