Abstract

Ronald Dworkin presents his philosophy of law as a critique and a rejection of some theories of law particularly, the theory of Legal Positivism. Legal positivism affirms a separation of law and morals, and that law must not determine or seek for its justification or validity outside itself. The theory rejects Natural Law, which makes law dependent on morals. Dworkin rejects Hart's positivist theory that law is a system of rules. Instead, he posits that law consists in rules and standards that he calls Principles. These principles are often moral in character. Dworkin makes a distinction between arguments of principle and arguments of policy. He states that in matters affecting individual rights, arguments of principles are most appropriate in order to protect those rights. Arguments of policy, he asserts, are most suitable in matters affecting a community. ;Dworkin's conception of law lies midway between Legal Positivism and the theory Natural Law. He rejects a separation of law and morals. Dworkin affirms morals as part of law, though; alone morals do not constitute the law. In his theory of Hard Cases, he maintains that there is only one right answer to every case at law. The judge has the duty to find the right answer that lies hidden in the law. He proposes that morals, principles, and interpretation should be the guide and that the judge must rely on them in his decision on hard cases. Dworkin makes the application of principles in judicial decisions binding on judges in cases where they are relevant. ;For Dworkin, law is not semantics but an interpretative concept. He denies that there is objectivity in interpretation. On the contrary, he insists on the independence of the interpreter. However, the independence of the interpreter does not mean that interpretation is a free zone. The interpreter, for example a judge, is independent; nevertheless, he must interpret in accordance with the criteria of what is acceptable as law within a community. ;Dworkin proposes Law as Integrity as his conception and theory of law. In his theory of Integrity, he insists on coherence in interpretation and in judicial decision. Law as Integrity is also an adjudicative and as well as a legislative theory