Wahrheit und selbstrückbezüglichkeit

Abstract
Summary This paper is intended to discuss the problems occurring in the relation between the notion of truth and the question of self-reference. To do this, we shall review Tarski's (T) convention and its related terminology. We shall clarify the relation between truth and extension in order to lead into the question of semantic paradoxes appearing in the theoretical models concerned with truth. Subsequently, we shall review the logical system which develops in the reformulation of the modal proposal of the (T) convention. In closing, we shall critically examine Kripke's interpretation from the proposals made by Tarski
Keywords truth  self-reference  extension  paradox
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DOI 10.1007/BF01801252
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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