Abstract

In the dissertation, I argue against an epistemological model of the elenchos as a search for moral truth, and propose a psychological model of Socratic method which is based on a moral aim to improve the interlocutor through self-knowledge, and presupposes the Socratic principle that all humans desire the good. I examine the method as a method of moral self-education, which has three functions: to refute, to persuade, and to seek truth. I show how Socrates constructs his arguments to satisfy the elenctic function of refutation and the protreptic function of persuasion, at the same time. I argue dig these two functions involve the use of ambiguity, and that such use is a means for conceptual reorientation, which ultimately aims to improve the interlocutor morally. My thesis is controversial because it stems to imply that Socrates engages in a sophistic-like conduct. I address this controversy, and the issue of whether Socratic method succeeds in its aim, by developing Socrates' conception of the soul and self-knowledge